Pseudorandom generators are fundamental to many theoretical and applied aspects of computing. We show h o w to construct a pseudorandom generator from any oneway function. Since it is easy to construct a one-way function from a pseudorandom generator, this result shows that there is a pseudorandom generator i there is a one-way function.
1 polynomial time computable function g that stretches a short random string x into a long string g(x) that \looks" random to any feasible algorithm, called an adversary. The adversary tries to distinguish the string g(x) from a random string the same length as g(x). The two strings \look" the same to the adversary if the acceptance probability for both strings is essentially the same. Thus, a pseudorandom generator can be used to e ciently convert a small amount of true randomness into a much larger numberof e ectively random bits.
The notion of randomness tests for a string evolved over time: from set-theoretic tests to enumerable Kol : 65], recursive and nally limited time tests. Motivated by cryptographic applications, the seminal paper BM : 82] introduces the idea of a generator which produces its output in polynomial time such that its output passes a general polynomial time test. The fundamental paper Yao : 82] introduced the de nition of a pseudorandom generator most commonly used today, and proves that this de nition and the original of BM : 82] are equivalent.
The robust notion of a pseudorandom generator, due to BM : 82], Yao : 82] , should be contrasted with the classical methods of generating random looking bits as described in, e.g., Knuth : 81] . In studies of classical methods, the output of the generator is considered good if it passes a particular set of standard statistical tests. The linear congruential generator is an example of a classical method for generating random looking bits that pass a variety of standard statistical tests. However, Boyar : 89] and Kraw : 92] show that there is a polynomial time statistical test which the output from this generator does not pass.
The distinction between the weaker requirement that the output pass some particular statistical tests and the stronger requirement that it pass all feasible tests is particularly important in the context of many applications. As pointed out by BM : 82], in cryptographic applications the adversary must be assumed to beasmalicious as possible, with the only restriction on tests being computation time. A pseudorandom generator can be directly used to design a private key cryptosystem secure against all such a d v ersaries.
In the context of Monte Carlo simulation applications, a typical algorithm uses long random strings, and a typical analysis shows that the algorithm produces a correct answer with high probability i f the string it uses is chosen uniformly. In practice, the long random string is not chosen uniformly, as this would require more random bits than it is typically reasonable to produce (and store). Instead, a short random string is stretched into a long string using a simple generator such as a linear congruential generator, and this long string is used by the simulation algorithm. In general, it is hard to directly analyze the simulation algorithm to prove that it produces the correct answer with high probability when the string it uses is produced using such a method. A pseudorandom generator provides a generic solution to this problem. For example, Yao : 82] shows how pseudorandom generators can be used to reduce the number of random bits needed for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, and thus shows how to perform a deterministic simulation of any polynomial time probabilistic algorithm in subexponential time based on a pseudorandom generator. The results on deterministic simulation were subsequently generalized in BH : 89], BFNW : 96].
Since the conditions are rather stringent, it is not easy to come up with a natural candidate for a pseudorandom generator. On the other hand, there seem to be a variety o f natural examples of another basic primitive the one-way function. Informally, f is one-way if it is easy to compute but hard on average to invert. If P=NP then there are no oneway functions, and it is not even known if P 6 = NP implies there are one-way functions.
However, there are many examples of functions that seem to be one-way in practice and that are conjectured to be one-way. Some examples of conjectured one-way functions are the discrete logarithm problem modulo a large randomly chosen prime (see, e.g., DH : 76]), factoring a numberthat is the product of two large randomly chosen primes (see, e.g., RSA : 78]), problems from coding theory (see, e.g., McEl : 78], GKL : 93]), and the subset sum problem for appropriately chosen parameters (see, e.g., IN : 96] ). The paper BM : 82] is the rst to construct a pseudorandom generator based on a one-way function. They introduce an elegant construction that shows how to construct a pseudorandom generator based on the presumed di culty of the discrete logarithm problem. The paper Yao : 82] substantially generalizes this result by showing how to to construct a pseudorandom generator from any one-way permutation. (Some of the arguments needed in the proof were missing in Yao : 82] and were later completed by Levin : 87] . Also, Levin : 87] conjectured that a much simpler construction would work for the case of oneway permutations, and this was eventually shown in GL : 89].)
There are several important works that have contributed to the expansion of the conditions on one-way functions under which a pseudorandom generator can beconstructed. GMT : 82] and Yao : 82] show h o w to construct a pseudorandom generator based on the di culty o f factoring, and this was substantially simpli ed in ACGS : 88]. When f is a one-way permutation, the task of inverting f(x) is to nd x. In the case when f is not a permutation, the natural extension of successful inversion to nding any x 0 such that f(x 0 ) = f(x). The paper Levin : 87] introduces one-way functions which remain one-way after several iterations and shows them to be necessary and su cient for the construction of a pseudorandom generator. The paper GKL : 93] shows how to construct a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function with the property that each v alue in the range of the function has roughly the same number of preimages. This expanded the list of conjectured one-way functions from which pseudorandom generators can beconstructed to a variety of non-number theoretic functions, including coding theory problems.
However, the general question of how to construct a pseudorandom generator from a oneway function with no structural properties was left open. This paper resolves this question. We give several successively more intricate constructions, starting with constructions for one-way functions with a lot of structure and nishing with the constructions for one-way functions with no required structural properties.
The current paper is a combination of the results announced in the conference papers ILL : 89] and H as : 90].
Concepts and tools
Previous methods, following BM : 82], rely on constructing a function that has an output bit that is computationally unpredictable given the other bits of the output, but is nevertheless statistically correlated with these other bits. GL : 89] provide a simple and natural input bit which is hidden from (a padded version of) any one-way function. Their result radically simpli es the previous constructions of pseudorandom generator from oneway permutations, and in addition makes all previous constructions substantially more e cient. We use their result in a fundamental way.
Our overall approach is di erent in spirit from previous constructions of pseudorandom generators based on one-way functions with special structure. Previous methods rely on iterating the one-way function many times, and from each iteration they extract a computationally unpredictable bit. The approach is to make sure that after many iterations the function is still one-way. In contrast, as explained below in more detail, our approach concentrates on extracting and smoothing entropy in parallel from many independent copies of the one-way function. Our overall construction combines this parallel approach with a standard method for iteratively stretching the output of a pseudorandom generator.
The notion of computational indistinguishability provides one of the main conceptual tools in our paper. Following GM : 84] and Yao : 82], we s a y that two probability distributions D and E are computationally indistinguishable if no feasible adversary can distinguish D from E. In these terms, a pseudorandom generator is intuitively the following: Let g be a polynomial time computable function that maps string of length n to longer strings of length`n > n. Let X bea random variable that is uniformly distributed on strings of length n and let Y be a random variable that is uniformly distributed on strings of length`n. Then, g is a pseudorandom generator if g(X) and Y are computationally indistinguishable.
The Shannon entropy of a distribution is a good measure of its information content. A fundamental law of information theory is that the application of a function cannot increase entropy. For example, because X has n bits of entropy, g(X) can also have at most n bits of entropy (see Proposition 2.2.4). The work presented in this paper focuses on a computational analog of Shannon entropy, namely computational entropy.
We say the computational entropy of g(X) is at least the Shannon entropy of Y if g(X) and Y are computationally indistinguishable. If g(X) is a pseudorandom generator, the computational entropy of g(X) is greater than the Shannon entropy of its input X, and in this sense g ampli es entropy.
We introduce the following generalizations of a pseudorandom generator based on computational entropy. We say that g(X) is a pseudoentropy generator if the computational entropy o f g(X) is signi cantly more than the Shannon entropy o f X. We s a y that g(X) i s a false entropy generator if the computational entropy of g(X) is signi cantly more than the Shannon entropy o f g(X).
We show how to construct a false entropy generator from any one-way function, a pseudoentropy generator from any false entropy generator and nally a pseudorandom generator from any pseudoentropy generator. (The presentation of these results in the paper is in reverse order.)
We use hash functions and their analysis in a fundamental way in our constructions. This approach has its roots in GKL : 93]. In GL : 89], it turns out that the easily computable bit that is hidden is the parity of a random subset of the input bits, i.e., the inner product of the input and a random string. This random inner product can beviewed as a hash function from many bits to one bit.
Due to its importance in such basic algorithms as primality testing, randomness has become an interesting computational resource in its own right. Recently, various studies for extracting good random bits from biased \slightly-random" sources that nevertheless possess a certain amount of entropy have beenmade these sources model the imperfect physical sources of randomness, such as ) One of our main technical lemmas, (Lemma 4.5.1), can be viewed as a hashing lemma which i s used to manipulate entropy in various ways: it can be viewed as a method for extracting close to uniform random bits from a slightly-random source using random bits as a catalyst.
Outline
An outline of the paper is as follows:
In Section 2 we g i v e notation, especially related to probability distributions and ensembles. In Section 3, we de ne the basic primitives used in the paper and a general notion of reduction between primitives. We spend a little more time on this than is conventional in papers on cryptography, since we want to discuss the e ects of reductions on security in quantitative terms.
Section 4 introduces the basic mechanisms for nding hidden bits and manipulating en-5 tropy with hash functions. The main result of the section is a reduction from a false entropy generator to a pseudorandom generator via a pseudoentropy generator.
In Section 5, we present a construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function where pre-image sizes can beestimated. Although such one-way functions are very common, and so this is an important special case, the main reason for including this is to develop intuition for general one-way functions.
Section 6 presents the most technically challenging construction, that of a false entropy generator from any one-way function. Combined with Section 4, this yields the main result of the paper, the construction of a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function.
In Section 7, we present a somewhat more direct and e cient construction of a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. It uses the ideas from Sections 4, 5, and 6, but avoids some redundancy involved in combining three generic reductions. Section 8 concludes by placing our results in the context of modern cryptographic complexity.
2 Basic notation N is the set of natural numbers. If S is a set then ]S is the number of elements in S. If S and T are sets then S n T is the set consisting of all elements in S that are not in T. If a is a number, then jaj is the absolute value of a, dae is the smallest integer greater than or equal to a, and log(a) is the logarithm base two o f a. Let x and y be bit strings. We let hx yi denote the sequence x followed by y, and when appropriate we also view this as the concatenation of x and y. If x 2 f 0 1g n then x i is the i th bit of x, x fi ::: jg is hx i : : : x j i, and x y is hx 1 y 1 : : : x n y n i. An m n bit matrix x is indicated by x 2 f 0 1g m n . We write x i j to refer to the (i j)-entry in x. We can also view x as a sequence x = hx 1 : : : x m i of m strings, each of length n, where in this case x i is the i th row of the matrix, or we can view x as a bit string of length mn, which is the concatenation of the rows of the matrix.
The operation indicates matrix multiplication over GF 2]. If x 2 f0 1g n appears to the left of then it is considered to be a row vector, and if it appears to the right of it is considered to be a column vector. Thus, if x 2 f0 1g n and y 2 f0 1g n then x y = P n i=1 x i y i mod 2. More generally, i f x 2 f 0 1g` m and y 2 f 0 1g m n then x y is the` n bit matrix, where the (i j)-entry is r c, w h e r e r is the i th row o f x and c is the j th column of y. 
Probability Notation
In general, we use capital and Greek letters to denote random variables and random events. Unless otherwise stated, all random variables are independent of all other random variables.
A distribution D on a nite set S assigns a probability D(x) 0 t o e a c h x 2 S, and thus P x2S D(x) = 1. We say a random variable X is distributed according to D on S if for all x 2 S, Pr X = x] = D(x), and we indicate this by X 2 D S. We write D : f0 1g`n to indicate that D is supported on strings of length`n. We sometimes, for convenience, blur the distinction between a random variable and its distribution. If X 1 and X 2 are random variables (that are not necessarily independent), then (X 1 jX 2 = x 2 ) d e n o t e s the random variable that takes on value x 1 with the conditional probability P r X 1 = x 1 jX 2 = x 2 ] = Pr X 1 = x 1^X2 = x 2 ]= Pr X 2 = x 2 ]. If f is a function mapping S to a set T, then f(X) is a random variable that de nes a distribution E, where for all y 2 T, E(y) = P x2S f(x)=y D(x). We let f(D) indicate the distribution E. We let X 2 U S indicate that X is uniformly distributed in S, i.e., for all x 2 S, Pr X = x] = 1 =]S. We let U n indicate the uniform distribution on f0 1g n , i.e., X is distributed according to U n if X 2 U f0 1g n .
We sometimes want to indicate a random sample chosen from a distribution, and we do this by using the same notation as presented above for random variables except that we use lower case letters, i.e., x 2 D S indicates that x is a xed element o f S chosen according to distribution D.
If X is a real-valued random variable, then E X] denotes the expected value X. If E is a probabilistic event, then Pr E] denotes the probability that event E occurs.
De nition 2.1.1 (statistical distance) Let De nition 2.2.5 (degeneracy of f) Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n and let X 2 U f0 1g n . The degeneracy of f is D n (f) = H(Xjf(X)) = H(X) ; H(f(X)):
Ensembles
We present all of our de nitions and results in asymptotic form. Ensembles are used to make the asymptotic de nitions, e.g., to de ne primitives such as one-way functions and pseudorandom generators, and to de ne the adversaries that try to break the primitives.
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In all cases, we use n 2 N as the index of the ensemble and implicitly the de nition and/or result holds for all values of n 2 N .
In our de nitions of ensembles, the input and output lengths are all polynomially related.
To specify this, we use the following.
De nition 2.3.1 (polynomial parameter) We say parameter k n is a polynomial parameter if there is a constant c > 0 such that for all n 2 N , 1 cn c k n cn c :
We say k n is P-time polynomial parameter if in addition there is a constant c 0 > 0 such that, for all n, k n is computable in time at most c 0 n c 0 .
In many uses of a polynomial parameter k n , k n is integer-valued, but it is sometimes the case that k n is real-valued.
De nition 2.3.2 (function ensemble) We let f : f0 1g tn ! f 0 1g`n denote a function ensemble, where t n and`n are integer-valued P-time polynomial parameters and where f with respect to n is a function mapping f0 1g tn to f0 1g`n. If f is injective then it is a one-to-one function ensemble. If f is injective and`n = t n then it is a permutation ensemble. We let f : f0 1g tn f 0 1g`n ! f 0 1g mn denote a function ensemble with two inputs. In this case, we sometimes consider f as being a function of the second input for a xed value of the rst input, in which case we write f x (y) in place of f(x y).
De nition 2.3.3 (P-time function ensemble) We say f : f0 1g tn f0 1g`n ! f 0 1g mn is a T n -time function ensemble if f is a function ensemble such that, for all x 2 f 0 1g tn , for all y 2 f0 1g`n, f(x y) is computable in time T n . We say f is a P-time function ensemble if there i s a c onstant c such that, for all n, T n cn c . We say f is a mildly nonuniform P-time function ensemble if it is a P-time function ensemble except that it has an additional input a n called the advice, that is an integer-valued polynomial parameter that is not necessarily P-time computable.
These de nitions generalize in a natural way to functions with more than two inputs. Sometimes we describe functions that have a variable length inputs or outputs in these cases we implicitly assume that the string is padded out with a special blank symbolto the appropriate length. Notice thatD f (z) is an approximation to within an additive factor of 1 of the quantity n;I f(X) (z). Furthermore, E D f (f(X))] is within an additive factor of 1 of the degeneracy of f. If f is a n -regular function then, for each z 2 range f ,D f (z) is within an additive factor of 1 of log( n ), which is the degeneracy of f.
De nition 2.3.7 (probability ensemble) We let D : f0 1g`n denote a probability ensemble, where`n is an integer-valued P-time polynomial parameter and where D with respect to n is a probability distribution on f0 1g`n.
De nition 2.3.8 (P-samplable probability ensemble) We let D : f0 1g`n denote a probability ensemble that, with respect to n, is a distribution on f0 1g`n that can be generated from a random string of length r n for some r n , i.e., there is a function ensemble f : f0 1g rn ! f 0 1g`n such that if X 2 U f0 1g rn then f(X) has the distribution D. We say D is T n -samplable probability ensemble if, for all x 2 f 0 1g rn , f(x) is computable in time T n . We say D is P-samplable if f is a P-time function ensemble, and D is mildly non-uniformly P-samplable if f is a mildly non-uniform P-time function ensemble.
De nition 2.3.9 (copies of functions and ensembles) Let k n be integer-valued Ptime polynomial parameter. If D : f0 1g`n is a probability ensemble then D kn : f0 1g`n kn is the probability ensemble where, with respect to parameter n, D kn consists of the concatenation of k n independent copies of D. Similarly, if f : f0 1g mn ! f0 1g`n is a function ensemble then f kn : f0 1g mnkn ! f 0 1g`n kn is the function ensemble where, for y 2 f 0 1g kn mn , f kn (y) = hf(y 1 ) : : : f (y kn )i 3 De nitions of primitives and reductions
Primitives described in this paper include one-way functions and pseudorandom generators. The primitives we describe can be used in cryptographic applications, but are also useful as described in the introduction in other applications. In the de nition of the primitives, we need to describe what it means for the primitive to be secure against an attack by a n a d v ersary. We rst introduce adversaries and security, and then describe the basic primitives that we use thereafter.
Adversaries and security
An adversary is, for example, trying to invert a one-way function or trying to distinguish the output of a pseudorandom generator from a truly random string. The time-success ratio of a particular adversary is a measure of its ability t o break the cryptographic primitive. (Hereafter, we use \primitive" in place of the more cumbersome and sometimes misleading phrase \cryptographic primitive".) The security of a primitive i s a l o wer bound on the time-success ratio of any adversary to break the primitive.
In the constructions of some primitives, we allow both private and public inputs. A public input is part of the output of the primitive and is known to the adversary at the time it tries to break the primitive. When we construct one primitive based on another, the constructed primitive often has public inputs. At rst glance it could seem that these public inputs are not useful because an adversary knows them at the time it tries to break the constructed primitive. On the contrary, public inputs turn out to be quite useful. Intuitively, this is because their value is randomly chosen, and the adversary cannot a priori build into its breaking strategy a strategy for all possible values.
The private input to a primitive i s n o t directly accessible to the adversary. The security parameter of a primitive is the length of its private input. This is because the private input to the primitive is what is kept secret from the adversary, and thus it makes sense to measure the success of the adversary in terms of this.
De nition 3.1.1 (breaking adversary and security) An adversary A is a function ensemble. The time-success ratio of A for an instance f of a primitive is de ned as R tn = T n =sp n (A), where t n is the length of the private input to f, and where T n is the worst case expected running time of A over all instances parameterized b y n, and sp n (A) is the success probability of A for breaking f. In this case, we say A is R-breaking adversary for f. We say f is R-secure if there is no R-breaking adversary for f. A mildly non-uniform adversary for a mildly non-uniform P-time function ensemble f that has advice a n is a function ensemble A which is given a n as an additional input. The success probability and time-success ratio for a mildly non-uniform adversary is the same as for uniform adversaries.
The de nition of the success probability sp n (A) for f depends on the primitive in question,
i.e., this probability is de ned when the primitive i s de ned. Intuitively, the smaller the time-success ratio of an adversary for a primitive, the better the adversary is able to break the primitive, i.e., it uses less time and/or has a larger success probability.
The above de nitions are a re nement of de nitions that appear in the literature. Previously, an adversary was considered to be breaking if it ran in polynomial time and had inverse polynomial success probability. The advantage of the de nition introduced here is that it is a more precise characterization of the security of a primitive. This is important because di erent applications require di erent levels of security. For some applications polynomial security is enough (e.g., R tn = t n 10 ) and for other applications better security is crucial (e.g., R tn = 2 log 2 (tn ) , o r e v en better R tn = 2 p tn ).
One-way function
De nition 3.2.1 (one-way function) Let f : f0 1g tn ! f 0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble and let X 2 U f0 1g tn . The success probability of adversary A for inverting f is
Then, f is a R-secure one-way function if there is no R-breaking adversary for f.
A function cannot be considered to be \one-way" in any reasonable sense in case the time to invert it is smaller than the time to evaluate it in the forward direction. The following alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable more accurately re ects the tradeo between the running time of the adversary and its success probability.
In the alternative de nition, success probability is de ned as sp 0 n (A) = (sp n (A)) 2 . This is because it takes 1=sp 0 n (A) trials in order to approximate sp n (A) to within a constant factor.
De nition 3.3.2 (computationally indistinguishable (alternative)) Exactly the same as the original de nition, except the success probability of adversary A is sp 0 n (A) =
In all cases except where noted, the strength of the reduction is the same under either de nition of computationally indistinguishable, and we nd it easier to work with the rst de nition. However, there are a few places where we explicitly use the alternative de nition to be able to claim the reduction is linear-preserving.
Strictly speaking, there are no private inputs in the above de nition, and thus by default we use n as the security parameter. However, in a typical use of this de nition, D is the distribution de ned by the output of a P-time function ensemble (and thus D is Psamplable), in which case the length of the private input to this function ensemble is the security parameter. In some circumstances, it is important that both D and E are P-samplable, e.g., this is the case for Proposition 4.6.2. The paper Yao : 82] originally gave the de nition of a pseudorandom generator as below, except that we parameterize security more precisely.
De nition 3.3.3 (pseudorandom generator) Let g : f0 1g tn ! f 0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble where`n > t n . Then, g is a R-secure pseudorandom generator if the probability ensembles g(U tn ) and U`n are R-secure computationally indistinguishable.
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The de nition of a pseudorandom generator only requires the generator to stretch the input by at least one bit. The following proposition provides a general way to produce a pseudorandom generator that stretches by many bits from a pseudorandom generator that stretches by at least one bit. This proposition appears in BH : 89] and is due to O. Goldreich and S. Micali. Proposition 3.3.4 Suppose g : f0 1g n ! f0 1g n+1 is a pseudorandom generator that stretches by one bit. De ne g (1) (x) = g(x), and inductively, for all i 1, g (i+1) (x) = hg(g (i) (x) f1 ::: ng ) g (i) (x) fn+1 ::: n+ig i: Let k n be an integer-valued P-time polynomial parameter. Then, g (kn) is a pseudorandom generator. The reduction is linear-preserving.
On page 16 we give a formal de nition of reduction and what it means to be linear-preserving, but intuitively it means that g (kn) as a pseudorandom generator is almost as secure as pseudorandom generator g.
Pseudoentropy and false-entropy generators
The de nitions in this subsection introduce new notions (interesting in their own right) which w e use as intermediate steps in our constructions.
The di erence between a pseudorandom generator and a pseudoentropy generator is that the output of a pseudoentropy generator doesn't have to be computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution, instead it must be computationally indistinguishable from some probability ensemble D that has more entropy than the input to the generator.
Thus, a pseudoentropy generator still ampli es randomness so that the output randomness is more computationally than the input randomness, but the output randomness is no longer necessarily uniform.
De nition 3.4.1 (computational entropy) Let f : f0 1g tn ! f0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble and let s n be a p olynomial parameter. Then, f has R-secure computational entropy s n if there i s a P-time function ensemble f 0 : f0 1g mn ! f 0 1g`n such that f(U tn ) and f 0 (U mn ) are R-secure c omputationally indistinguishable and H(f 0 (U mn )) s n .
De nition 3.4.2 (pseudoentropy generator) Let f : f0 1g tn ! f 0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble and let s n be a polynomial parameter. Then, f is a R-secure pseudoentropy generator with pseudoentropy s n if f(U tn ) has R-secure computational entropy If f is a pseudorandom generator then it is easy to see that it is also a pseudoentropy generator. This is because f(U tn ) and U`n are computationally indistinguishable and by de nition of a pseudorandom generator,`n > t n . Consequently, H(U`n) =`n t n + 1 , i.e., f is a pseudoentropy generator with pseudoentropy at least 1.
A false entropy generator is a further generalization of pseudoentropy generator. A false entropy generator doesn't necessarily amplify the input randomness, it just has the property that the output randomness is computationally more than it is statistically.
De nition 3.4.3 (false entropy generator) Let f : f0 1g tn ! f0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble and let s n be a polynomial parameter. Then, f is a R-secure false entropy generator with false-entropy s n if f(U tn ) has R-secure computational entropy H(f(U tn )) + s n .
Note that, in the de nition of computational entropy, the function ensemble f 0 that is computationally indistinguishable from f is required to beP-time computable. This is consistent with the de nition of a pseudorandom generator, where the distribution that the pseudorandom generator is indistinguishable from is the uniform distribution. There is also a non-uniform version of computational entropy where f 0 is not necessarily P-time computable, and corresponding non-uniform versions of a pseudoentropy generator and false entropy generator. It turns out to beeasier to construct a false entropy generator f where f 0 is not necessarily P-time computable from a one-way function than it is to construct a false entropy generator f where f 0 is P-time samplable. Using this approach and a non-uniform version of Proposition 4.6.2, ILL : 89] describe a non-uniform reduction from a one-way function to a pseudorandom generator. However, a uniform reduction using Proposition 4.6.2 requires that f 0 beP-time computable. Thus, one of the main di culties in our constructions below is to build a false entropy generator f where f 0 is P-time computable.
Hidden bits
In the construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function, one of the key ideas is to construct from the one-way function another function which has an output bit that is computationally unpredictable from the other output bits (it is \hidden") and yet statistically somewhat predictable from the other output bits. This idea is used in the original construction of a pseudorandom generator from the discrete logarithm problem BM : 82] and has been central to all such constructions since that time.
De nition 3.5.1 (hidden bit) Let f : f0 1g tn ! f0 1g`n and b : f0 1g tn ! f0 1g be P-time function ensembles. Let D : f0 1g tn be a P-samplable probability ensemble, let X 2 D f0 1g tn , and let 2 U f0 1g. Then, b(X) is R-secure hidden given f(X) if hf(X) b (X)i and hf(X) i are R-secure computationally indistinguishable.
Reductions
All of the results presented in this paper involve a reduction from one type of primitive t o another.
We make the following de nitions to quantify the strength of reductions. The particular parameterization of security and the di erent quantitative measures of the security preserving properties of a reduction are derived from Luby : 96], HL : 92].
Intuitively, a reduction constructs from a rst primitive f on inputs of length t n a second primitive g (f ) on inputs of length t 0 n . The reduction also speci es an oracle TM M ( ) such that if there is an adversary A for breaking g (f ) then M (A) is an adversary for breaking f. How m uch security is preserved by the reduction is parameterized by S.
De nition 3.6.1 (reduction) Let t n and t 0 n be polynomial parameters and let S : N < is a P-time function ensemble, and on inputs of length t 0 n , only makes calls to f on inputs of length t n .
Suppose A is an adversary with time-success ratio R 0 t 0 n for g (f ) on inputs of length t 0 n . De ne R tn = S(n R 0 t 0 n ). Then, M (A) is an adversary with time-success ratio R tn for f on inputs of length t n .
To discuss the security preserving properties of the reduction, we compare how well A breaks g (f ) to how well M 
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A mildly non-uniform reduction has the same properties except that g ( ) and M ( ) are b oth allowed a c cess to an integer-valued p olynomial parameter a n that depends on f. The same notions of security preservation apply to mildly non-uniform reductions.
f can always be broken in time exponential in t n . Therefore, if R 0 t 0 n 2 tn , or even R 0 t 0 n 2 t (1) n = 2 n (1) in the case of a weak-preserving reduction, M (A) can ignore the oracle and break f by brute force. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that R 0 t 0 n 2 tn .
Obvious from the de nition of reduction are the following propositions, that say that security is preserved by reductions, and that reductions can be composed:
) is a (mildly non-uniform) S-reduction from primitive 1 to primitive 2 and f is a (mildly non-uniform) P-time function ensemble that instantiates primitive 1 with security R tn , then g (f ) is a (mildly non-uniform) P-time function ensemblethat instantiates primitive 2 with security R 0 t Although we phrase our de nitions in terms of asymptotic complexity, one can easily interpret them for xed length inputs in the context of an actual implementation, just as one does for algorithm analysis.
Clearly, in standard situations, t 0 n t n and R tn R 0 t 0 n , and the closer these two inequalities are to equalities the more the security o f f is transferred to g. We now describe how the slack in these inequalities a ects the security preserving properties of the reduction.
The number of calls M (A) makes to A is invariably either a constant or depends polynomially on the time-success ratio of A, and thus R tn is at most polynomial in R 0 t 0 n . The slackness in this inequality turns out not to be the major reason for a loss in security i n the reduction, instead it primarily depends on how m uch larger t 0 n is than t n . If t 0 n is much larger than t n then R tn is much larger as a function of t n than R 0 t 0 n is as a function of t 0 n .
We can formalize this as follows. It is important to design the strongest reduction possible. The techniques described in this paper can be directly used to yield poly-preserving reductions from regular or nearly regular (with polynomial time computable degree of regularity) one-way functions to pseudorandom generators Luby : 96] , and this covers almost all of the conjectured one-way functions. However, the reduction for general one-way functions is only weak-preserving.
Proposition 4.1.1 Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a one-way function. Then, X R is hidden given hf(X) R i, where X R 2 U f0 1g n . The reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
Proposition 4.1.1 presents an elegant, simple and general method of obtaining a hidden bit from a one-way function. We need the following stronger proposition of GL : 89] (see also Levin : 93] ) in some of our proofs.
Proposition 4.1.2 There is an oracle TM M with the following properties. Let A be any adversary that accepts as input n bits and outputs a single bit. Then, M (A) on input parameter n > 0 outputs a list L of n-bit strings with the following property: for any xed x 2 f 0 1g n , i f it is the case that j Pr A(R) = x R] ; Pr A(R) 6 = x R]j n where R 2 U f0 1g n , then, with probability at least 1=2, it is the case that x 2 L. (The probability here only depends on the values of the random bits used b y M (A) .) The running Proposition 4.1.3 Let f : f0 1g n ! f 0 1g`n be a one-way function. Then, hf(X) R X Ri and hf(X) R i are computationally indistinguishable, where X R 2 U f0 1g n and 2 U f0 1g. The reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
One-way permutation to a pseudorandom generator
We describe a way to construct a pseudorandom generator from any one-way permutation which is substantially simpler (and has stronger security preserving properties) than the original construction of Yao : 82] . The construction and proof described here is due to GL : 89].
Proposition 4.2.1 Let f : f0 1g n ! f 0 1g n be a one-way permutation. Let x r 2 f 0 1g n and de ne P-time function ensemble g(x r) = hf(x) r x ri. Then, g is a pseudorandom
generator. The reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
PROOF: Let X R2 U f0 1g n , and 2 U f0 1g. Because f is a permutation, hf(X) R i is the uniform distribution on f0 1g 2n+1
. By Proposition 4.1.3, g(X R) and hf(X) R i are computationally indistinguishable, where the reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
The reason Proposition 4.2.1 works when f is a permutation is because:
(1) f(X) is uniformly distributed and hence already looks random.
(2) For any x 2 f 0 1g n , f(x) uniquely determines x. So no entropy is lost by the application of f, For a general one-way function neither (1) nor (2) necessarily holds. Intuitively, the rest of the paper constructs a one-way function with properties (1) and (2) from a general one-way function. This is done by using hash functions to smooth the entropy of f(X) to make it more uniform, and to recapture the entropy of X lost by the application of f(X).
Proposition 4.2.1 produces a pseudorandom generator that only stretches the input by one bit. To construct a pseudorandom generator that stretches by many bits, combine this with the construction described previously in Proposition 3.3.4.
4.3 One-to-one one-way function to a pseudoentropy generator
We n o w describe a construction of a pseudoentropy generator from any one-to-one one-way function. This construction, together with Theorem 4.6.4, yields a pseudorandom generator from any one-to-one one-way function. The overall construction is di erent in spirit than the original construction of GKL : 93]: it illustrates how to construct a pseudoentropy generator in a particularly simple way using GL : 89]. Although the assumptions and the consequences are somewhat di erent, the construction is the same as described in Proposition 4.2.1.
Proposition 4.3.1 Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a one-to-one one-way function. Let x r 2 f0 1g n and de ne P-time function ensemble g(x r) = hf(x) r x ri: Then, g is a pseudoentropy generator with pseudoentropy 1. The reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
PROOF: Let X R 2 U f0 1g n and 2 U f0 1g. Proposition 4.1.3 shows that g(X R) and hf(X) R i are computationally indistinguishable, where the reduction is linear-preserving with respect to the alternative de nition of computationally indistinguishable.
Because f is a one-to-one function and is a random bit, H(f(X) R ) = 2 n + 1 , and thus g(X R) has pseudoentropy 1 . Note that it is not possible to argue that g is a pseudorandom generator. For example, let f(x) = h0 f 0 (x)i where f 0 is a one-way permutation. Then, f is a one-to-one one-way function and yet g(X R) = hf(X) R X Ri is not a pseudorandom generator, because the rst output bit of g is zero independent o f its inputs, and thus its output can easily be distinguished from a uniformly chosen random string.
Universal hash functions
The concept of a universal hash function, introduced in CW : 79], has proved to have far reaching and a broad spectrum of applications in the theory of computation.
De nition 4.4.1 (universal hash functions) Let h : f0 1g`n f 0 1g n ! f 0 1g mn be a P-time function ensemble. Recall from de nition 2.3.2 that for xed y 2 f0 1g`n, we 20 view y as describing a function h y ( ) that maps n bits to m n bits. Then, h is a (pairwise independent) universal hash function if, for all x 2 f0 1g n , x 0 2 f0 1g n n f xg, for all a a 0 2 f 0 1g mn , Pr (h Y (x) = a) and (h Y (x 0 ) = a 0 ) ] = 1 =2 2mn where Y 2 U f0 1g`n.
Intuitively, a universal hash function has the property that every distinct pair x and x 0 are mapped randomly and independently with respect to Y .
In all of our constructions of function ensembles using universal hash functions, the description of the hash function y is viewed as a public input to the function ensemble, and thus is also part of the output. The following construction is a universal hash function is due to CW : 79].
De nition 4.4.2 (matrix construction) Let h : f0 1g (n+1)mn f 0 1g n ! f 0 1g mn be the following P-time function ensemble. For x 2 f0 1g n and y 2 f0 1g (n+1) mn , h y (x) = hx 1i y.
We concatenate a 1 to x in the above de nition to cover the case when x = 0 n . Hereafter, whenever we refer to universal hash functions, one can think of the construction given above. However, any universal hash function that satis es the required properties may b e used. We note that there are more e cient hash functions in terms of number of bits used in speci cation. One such example is using Toeplitz matrices (see for example GL : 89] or Levin : 93]). A T oeplitz matrix is a matrix which i s constant on any diagonal, and thus to specify an n m Toeplitz matrix we can specify values for the m + n ; 1 diagonals, This is the simplest bit-e cient construction of a universal hash function, so we adopt it as the default for the remaining paper.
Smoothing distributions with hashing
The following lemma is a key component in most of the subsequent reductions we describe.
Lemma 4.5.1 Let D : f0 1g n be a probability ensemble that has Renyi entropy at least m n . Let e n be a p ositive integer valued p arameter. Let h : f0 1g`n f0 1g n ! f 0 1g mn;2en be a universal hash function. Let X 2 D f0 1g n , Y 2 U f0 1g`n, and Z 2 U f0 1g mn;2en . The lemma can beinterpreted as follows: The universal hash function smooths out the Renyi entropy o f X to the almost uniform distribution on bit strings of length almost m n . The integer parameter e n controls the tradeo between the uniformity of the output bits of the universal hash function and the amount of entropy lost in the smoothing process.
Thus, we h a ve managed to convert almost all the Renyi entropy o f X into uniform random bits while maintaining our original supply of random bits Y .
PROOF: Let`=`n, e = e n and m = m n and s = m ; 2e. For all y 2 f 0 1g`, a 2 f 0 1g s and x 2 f 0 1g n , de ne (h y (x) = a) = 1 i f h y (x) = a and 0 otherwise. Corollary 4.5.3 Let k n be a n integer-valued P-time polynomial parameter.
Let D : f0 1g n be a probability ensemble, let m n = k n H(D) ; 2nk 
Pseudoentropy generator to a pseudorandom generator
Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a pseudoentropy generator with pseudoentropy s n . In this subsection, we construct a pseudorandom generator based on f. We rst start with two preliminary propositions. The following proposition is the computational analog of Proposition 2. is a R n -breaking adversary for distinguishing D and E, where R n is essentially equal to k n R 0 nkn . It is crucial that D and E are P-samplable because the sampling algorithms are used by M. The reduction is only weak-preserving because distinguishing D kn and E kn with respect to private inputs of length nk n only translates into distinguishing D and E on private inputs of length n. We n o w give the construction of a pseudorandom generator g from a pseudoentropy generator f. H(f 0 (X 0 )) n + s n , by choice of k n and j n , using Corollary 4.5.3, it follows that L 1 (hh Y (f 0 kn (W )) Y i U jn+pn ) 2 ;k 1=3 n . Thus, it follows that g(U Y ) and U jn+pn are computationally indistinguishable. Note that by choice of k n , the output length j n + p n of g is longer than its input length nk n + p n .
False entropy generator to a pseudoentropy generator
Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a false entropy generator with false entropy s n . In this subsection, we construct a mildly non-uniform pseudoentropy generator based on f. An idea is to extractD f (f(X)) bits of entropy out of X without compromising the false entropy. (See page 10 for the de nition ofD f .) Let X 2 U f0 1g n . The major obstacles are thatD f is not necessarily a P-time function ensemble and that f could be a very non-regular function, and thus the variance ofD f (f(X)) could be quite high as a function of X, and we cannot guess its value consistently with accuracy.
Let k n beaninteger-valued P-time polynomial parameter and let U 2 U f0 1g kn n . The intuition behind the following construction is that the false entropy o f f kn is k n times that of f and that the degeneracy of f kn is k n times that of f. Furthermore, if k n is large enough then, with high probability with respect to U,D f kn (f kn (U)) is close to the degeneracy of f kn . Thus, we use a universal hash function h to extract roughly the degeneracy of f kn (U) bits of entropy out of U without compromising the false entropy o f f kn (U).
Construction 4.7.1 Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble. Let s n be a P-time polynomial parameter and assume for simplicity that s n 1. Let e n be an approximation of H(f(X)) to within an additive factor of s n =8, where X 2 U f0 1g n . Fix k n = (4n=s n ) 3 and j n = l k n (n ; e n ) ; 2nk 2=3 n m . Let h : f0 1g pn f 0 1g nkn ! f 0 1g jn be a universal hash function. For u 2 f 0 1g kn n and r 2 f 0 1g pn , de ne P-time function ensemble g(e n u r ) = hf kn (u) h r (u) r i: Lemma 4.7.2 Let f and g be as described in Construction 4.7.1. Let f be a false entropy generator with false entropy s n . Then, g is a mildly non-uniform pseudoentropy generator with pseudoentropy 1. The reduction is weak-preserving. PROOF: Let Z 2 U f0 1g jn . First, note that H(Xjf(X)) = n ; H(f(X)) = n ; e n . >From this and Corollary 4.5.3 (letting X 1 = f(X), X 2 = X in the corollary), it follows that L 1 (g(e n U R ) hf kn (U) Z R i) 2 ;k 1=3 n .
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We now prove that g(e n U R ) has computational entropy at least p n + nk n + 1 . Let D : f0 1g`n bethe P-samplable probability ensemble such that D and f(X) are computationally indistinguishable and such that H(D) H(f(X)) + s n : Since D and f(X) are computationally indistinguishable, hf kn (U) Z R i and hD kn Z R i are computationally indistinguishable by Proposition 4.6.2, which together with the rst claim implies that g(e n U R ) and hD kn Z R i are computationally indistinguishable. Now, H(D kn Z R ) k n (H(f(X)) + s n ) + j n + p n k n (e n + 7 s n =8) + j n + p n and because by c hoice of k n and j n this is at least p n +nk n + 1 . Thus, g has computational entropy a t l e a s t p n + nk n + 1, and the lemma follows.
Mildly non-uniform to a uniform pseudorandom generator
Proposition 4.8.1 Let a n be any value in f0 : : : k n g, where k n is an integer-valued P-time polynomial parameter. Let g : f0 1g dlog(kn)e f 0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble, where`n > nk n . Let x 0 2 f0 1g kn n and de ne P-time function ensemble g 0 (x 0 ) = kn i=1 g(i x 0 i ): Let g be a mildly non-uniform pseudorandom generator when the rst input is set to a n . Then, g 0 is a pseudorandom generator. The reduction is weak-preserving.
PROOF: Let X 2 U f0 1g n , X 0 2 U f0 1g kn n and Z 2 U f0 1g`n. Suppose there is an adversary A that has distinguishing probability sp n (A) = Pr A(g 0 (X 0 )) = 1] ; Pr A(Z) = 1 ] :
We describe an oracle TM M such that, for all i = 1 : : : k n , M
(i) has sp n (A) distinguishing probability for g(i X) and Z. For all i, the running time for M (A) (i) is the running time for A plus the time to run compute the output of g on k n ; 1 inputs. Since this works with respect to all i, in particular it works when i = a n , from which the result follows. (i) has distinguishing probability sp n (A) for g(i X) and Z.
Note that it may be the case that, for most xed values of i 2 f1 : : : k n g, g(i X) is completely predictable. On the other hand, even if there is a value a n for each n such that g(a n X ) is pseudorandom, the value of a n may not be P-time computable. This is exactly the case when the lemma is useful, i.e., it is useful to transform the mildly non-uniform pseudorandom generator g into a pseudorandom generator g 0 . Note in the given construction, the length of the output of g 0 on inputs of length nk n is n > n k n , and thus g 0 stretches the input to a string of strictly greater length.
This reduction is only weak-preserving, and the reason is the usual one, i.e., the breaking adversary for g 0 (X 0 ) on inputs of length nk n is transferred into a breaking adversary for g(i X) on inputs of length only n. If g in Proposition 4.8.1 does not satisfy the property t h a t n > n k n , then for each xed i we can use Proposition 3.3.4 to stretch the output of g(i x) (viewed as a function of x) into a string of length longer than nk n and then exclusive-or together the stretched outputs.
Summary
Putting together the results in this section, we h a ve:
A reduction from a one-way permutation to a pseudorandom generator. (From Subsection 4.2.) A reduction from a one-to-one one-way function to a pseudorandom generator. (Combining Subsections 4.3 and 4.6.) A reduction from a pseudoentropy generator to a pseudorandom generator. (From Subsection 4.6.) A reduction from a false entropy generator to a pseudorandom generator. (Combining Subsections 4.7, 4.6, and 4.8.) 5 Extracting entropy from one-way functions
In this ection we show how to construct a pseudoentropy generator from any one-way function f with the additional property that the numberofinverses of f can be computed in polynomial time, i.e., the functionD f is a P-time function ensemble. Combined with the results summarized in Subsection 4.9, this gives a construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function with this property.
One of the reasons for giving the rst construction is because it illustrates some of the additional ideas needed for our construction of a false entropy generator from any oneway function. A general one-way function f does not necessarily have the property that D f is a P-time function ensemble, and considerably more e ort is needed to construct a pseudorandom generator from it. In the subsequent section, we describe how to construct a false entropy generator from any one-way function. Combined with the results summarized in Subsection 4.9, this gives a construction of a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function.
5.1 One-way function with approximable pre-image sizes to a pseudoentropy generator
To see where we g e t i n to trouble with the construction given in Proposition 4.3.1, suppose f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n is a 2 n=4 -regular one-way function, and let X R 2 U f0 1g n and 2 U f0 1g. Then, although hf(X) R X Ri and hf(X) R i are computationally indistinguishable, H(f(X) R X R) is only about 7n=4 + 1, and thus we h a ve lost about n=4 bits of the input entropy through the application of f. Similarly, although X R is hidden given hf(X) R i, it is also almost completely statistically uncorrelated.
The idea to overcome these problems is to create a new function which is the original one-way function concatenated with the degeneracy of the function number of bits hashed out of its input to regain the lost entropy. Then, Proposition 4.3.1 can be applied to the new function to obtain a pseudoentropy generator. We rst show h o w to construct a pseudoentropy generator in the case whenD f is a P-time function ensemble.
Construction 5.1.1 Let f : f0 1g n ! f 0 1g`n be a P-time function ensemble and suppose thatD f is a P-time function ensemble. Let h : f0 1g pn f 0 1g n ! f 0 1g n+2 be a universal hash function. For x 2 f 0 1g n and y 2 f 0 1g pn , d e n e P-time function ensemble f 0 (x y) = hf(x) h y (x) f1 ::: D f (f (x))+2g y i:
Lemma 5.1.2 Let f and f 0 be as described in Construction 5.1.1.
(1) Let f be a one-way function. Then, f 0 is a one-way function. The reduction is poly-preserving.
(2) Let X 2 U f0 1g n and Y 2 U f0 1g pn . Then, H(f 0 (X Y)) n + p n ; 1=2.
PROOF of (1) : Suppose adversary A inverts f 0 (X Y) with probability n in time T n . We prove that the following oracle TM M using A on input z = f(x) nds x 0 2 pre f (z) with probability at least
ComputeD f (z).
Choose 2 U f0 1gD f (z)+2 . Choose y 2 U f0 1g pn .
If A(z y) outputs x 0 with f(x 0 ) = z then output x 0 .
Let j n = 2 dlog(2= n )e. For all z 2 range f , for all y 2 f 0 1g pn , de ne random variable By calculating the Renyi entropy it follows that H(f 0 (X Y)) ; log 5 4 2 ;n+pn = n + p n + 2 ; log(5):
The result follows since log(5) 5=2.
Corollary 5.1.3 Let f, h and f 0 be as described in Construction 5.1.1. Let r 2 f 0 1g n and de ne P-time function ensemble g(x y r) = hf 0 (x y) r x ri: Let f be a one-way function. Then, g i s a p s e u d o entropy generator with pseudoentropy 1=2. The reduction is poly-preserving.
PROOF: The proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 4.3.1. Let X R 2 U f0 1g n , Y 2 U f0 1g pn , a n d 2 U f0 1g. From Lemma 5.1.2, part (1) and Proposition 4.1.3 it follows that g(X Y R) and hf 0 (X Y) R i are computationally indistinguishable, where the reduction is poly-preserving. From Lemma 5.1.2, part (2) it follows that H(f 0 (X Y) R ) 2n + p n + 1 =2. On the other hand, the input entropy t o g(X Y R) i s 2 n + p n , a n d t h us it follows that g has pseudoentropy 1 =2.
Theorem 5.1.4 A pseudorandom generator can be constructed from a one-way function f whereD f is a P-time function ensemble. The reduction is weak-preserving.
PROOF: Combine Construction 5.1.1 with Construction 4.6.3, and use Corollary 5.1.3 and Theorem 4.6.4.
The following theorem, an easy corollary of Theorem 5.1.4, was previously obtained by GKL : 93] using a di erent construction and proof techniques.
Theorem 5.1.5 Let f : f0 1g n ! f0 1g`n be a n -regular one-way function, where n is a P-time polynomial parameter. Then, a pseudorandom generator can be constructed from f. The reduction is weak-preserving.
PROOF: Note that in this caseD f (f(x)) = dlog( n )e for all x 2 f0 1g n . Furthermore, dlog( n )e 2 f0 : : : n g. Using this, and combining Construction 5.1.1 with Construction 4.6.3, and using Corollary 5.1.3 and Theorem 4.6.4 yields a mildly non-uniform pseudorandom generator. Then, Theorem 4.8 shows how to construct a pseudorandom generator from this.
Based on the ideas presented above, Luby : 96] (Theorem 10.1 and Theorem 9.3) gives versions of Theorem 5.1.4 and Theorem 5.1.5 where the reduction is poly-preserving when the security parameter is P-time computable.
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6 Any one-way function to a false entropy generator 6.1 Finding determined hidden bits
The nal step in the general construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function is to construct a false entropy generator from any one-way function. This is the technically most di cult part of this paper. This construction uses some of the ideas from Construction 5.1.1. Let f : f0 1g n ! f 0 1g`n (1) be a one-way function and let h : f0 1g pn f 0 1g n ! f 0 1g n+dlog(2n)e (2) be a universal hash function. Similar to Construction 5.1.1, for x 2 f 0 1g n , i 2 f 0 : : : n ; 1g and r 2 f 0 1g pn , de ne P-time function ensemble f 0 (x i r) = hf(x) h r (x) f1 ::: i+dlog(2n)eg i r i:
Note that from Lemma 5.1.2, the restricted function f 0 (x D f (f(x)) r ) is an almost oneto-one one-way function, except that this is not necessarily a P-time function ensemble sinceD f may n o t b e a P-time function ensemble, and this is the main di culty w e m ust overcome.
Let X 2 U f0 1g n , R 2 U f0 1g p(n) , Y 2 U f0 1g n and 2 U f0 1g. O(1) . Finally, we use the same idea as in Lemma 5.1.2, i.e., the success probability o f M 0(A) on input hf(x) i R i for 2 U f0 1g i+dlog(2n)e is at least inverse polynomial in the success probability o f M 0(A) on input f 0 (x i R) for each xed hx ii 2 T . Consider the following oracle TM N: N A on input f(x) c hooses i 2 U f0 : : : n ; 1g, 2 U f0 1g i+dlog(2n)e , a n d r 2 U f0 1g pn and runs M 0(A) on input hf(x) i r i. Since Pr hx ii 2 T ] 1=n when i 2 U f0 : : : n ; 1g, it follows that N A (f(X)) produces an inverse with probability at least 1=n times the probability M 0(A) (f 0 (W R )) produces an inverse.
If i D f (f(X)) then X is almost completely determined by f 0 (X i R), and thus X Y is almost completely determined by f 0 (X i R) and Y . The interesting case is when i =D f (f(X)), in which case, from Lemma 6.1.1, the adversary is unable to distinguish X Y from given Y and f 0 (X i R), and yet from part (2) of Lemma 5.1.2, X Y is almost completely determined by f 0 (X i R) and Y . It is from this case that we can extract a little bit of false entropy.
Construction and Main Theorem
We n o w describe the construction of a false entropy generator g based on f 0 . Let k n 125n
Part of the construction is to independently and randomly choose k n sets of inputs to f 0 , and concatenate the outputs, In particular, let X 0 2 U f0 1g kn n , I 0 2 U f0 1g kn dlog(n)e , R 0 2 U f0 1g kn pn . Part of the construction is then f 0 kn (X 0 I 0 R 0 ). Let I 2 U f0 : : : n ; 1g, l e t p n = P r I D f (f(X))]
(5) and let m n = k n p n ; 2k 2=3 n : (6) We show later that it is su cient to have an approximation of p n to within an additive factor of 1=n for the entire construction to work. We need this to beable to claim that g described below is mildly non-uniform. For now w e assume we have the exact value of p n . Let Y 0 2 U f0 1g kn n . The value of k n is chosen to be large enough so that with high probability it is the case that I 0 The problem is that we don't know for which set of m n values of j the bit X 0 j Y 0 j looks random to a time limited adversary. Instead, the idea is to hash m n bits out of all k n 32 such bits and release the hashed bits. The intuition is that these m n hashed bits will look random to a time limited adversary, even though there are really at most (p n ; 1=n)k n bits of randomness left in these k n bits after seeing Y 0 and f 0 kn (X 0 I Theorem 6.2.1 Let f be a one-way function and g be as described a b ove in equations (1) through ( with probability p n ; 1=n, it follows that the additional entropy added by X 0 j Y 0 j is at most p n ; 1=2n. Therefore, the additional entropy in the rst m n bits of D is at most k n (p n ; 1=2n) = m n + 2 k 2=3 n ; k n =2n < m n ; 10n The proof of Lemma 6.3.2 is the most technically involved in this paper. Before proving this lemma, we give the main corollary to this lemma, and then give some motivation for the proof of the lemma. We now give some intuition to the proof of Lemma 6.3.2. The oracle TM M (A) will use a non-straightforward hybrid of distributions argument to beable to distinguish the two distributions in the statement of the lemma. To give some intuition about this nonstraightforward hybrid, we rst describe a related straightforward hybrid argument that we do not know h o w to implement e ciently.
Consider the following distribution. For j 2 f 1 : : : k n g, let C j = 1 with probability p n and C j = 0 with probability 1 ; p n . For all j, if C j = 1 then let hX 0 From Lemma 6.1.1 intuitively it should be the case that a time limited adversary should not be able to distinguish D from D 0 . On the other hand, it is not hard to see using Lemma 4.5.1 that the statistical distance between D 0 and E is exponentially small in n. Thus )] = n =k n .
An ine cient oracle TM could work as follows on input hf 0 (w r) b y i: The rst phase chooses j 2 U f1 : : : k n g, and chooses a sample from F (j) . If c j = 0 then the oracle TM produces a random bit and stops. In the more interesting case, where c j = 1 , it replaces the inputs corresponding to the j th position in the sample according to f 0 (w r) and y, and the j th input bit of h u is set to b 2 U f0 1g. Then, the second phase runs the adversary A on this input and outputs the bit produced by A. The distinguishing probability for t h i s o r a c l e T M i s n =k n . The problem is that this is not an e cient oracle TM, because it may not be possible to e ciently uniformly sample from T and T as required. However, it is possible to sample uniformly from f0 1g n f 0 : : : n ; 1g, and a p n fraction of the samples will berandomly distributed in T and a 1 ; p n fraction of the samples will be randomly distributed in T , and this simple idea is used to construct the e cient adversary described below.
The e cient adversary M (A) described in detail in the proof of Lemma 6.3.2 proceeds in two phases similar to the ine cient oracle TM described above. The rst phase of M (A) consists of k n stages, where stage j produces a coupled pair of distributions, D . The rst j ; 1 positions in both D (j) and E (j) are already xed in essentially the same 35 way i n D (j;1) and E (j;1) , and these positions will be xed the same way i n D (j) and E (j) .
To ll in position j in D (j) and E (j) , many samples of hx j i j i are drawn uniformly from f0 1g n f 0 : : : n ; 1g, and then with high probability many of them will be in T and many will be in T . We cannot directly tell for each sample whether it is in T or T . Thus, we must use another criteria to decide which of the samples to keep to ll in position j. The criteria used is to use the sample for which the distinguishing probability of A between D (j) and E (j) is highest when the j th position is xed according to the sample. 
] n =k n :
It is because of this discrepancy between the value of (j) and (j;1) that f 0 can be inverted in the second phase.
Intuitively, stage j of the rst phase works as follows. A b i t c j is chosen randomly to be one with probability p n and to be zero with probability 1 ; p n . In the distribution D (j) , the j th input hx 0 j i 0 j r 0 j i to f 0 kn is chosen randomly, y 0 j is chosen randomly, u is chosen randomly, and then the j th input bit of h 0 u is set to a random bit b j if c j = 1 and to the correct inner product bit if c j = 0 . In the distribution E (j) , the j th input of f 0 kn is set the same way i t i s s e t i n D (j) , and thus the two distributions D (j) and E (j) are correlated. The choice of the j th inputs is done several times (c j is chosen only once at the beginning, i.e., it is not rechosen for each of the times) and each time the distinguishing probability o f A for D (j) and the corresponding E (j) is approximated, and the choice that maximizes the di erence between these accepting probabilities determines how D (j) and E (j) are nally set.
The second phase of M (A) chooses j 2 U f1 : : : k n g and then uses the pair of distributions D (j) and E (j) produced in the rst stage. The idea is to choose a random sample from both D (j) and E (j) , modify portions of the D (j) part according to the input to M (A) , and run A on both the modi ed D (j) sample and the E (j) sample and based on the outputs produce a one bit output. The intuition is that the distinguishing probability will be (j) , which o n a verage over all j is at least n =k n .
We n o w turn to the formal proof of Lemma 6.3. where j 2 U f0 : : : k n ; 1g in the last two expectations. To p r o ve the lemma, it is su cient to show that E j (j) ]=2 , or equivalently, E X j2f0 ::: kn;1g (j) ] 2 k n = n =8: (9) The expectation here is over the random choices of M (A) in the rst phase. Let From our choice of and the fact that 1=n p n 1 ; 1=n, it follows that, with probability a t least 1 ; 2 ;n , at least n= of the w m 's are in T , and at least n= of the w m 's are in T . It then follows using Cherno bounds that
Pr max
We still need to use Proposition 4.8.1 to get rid of the mild non-uniformity. From the arguments above, it is clear that an approximation of both e n and p n that is within 1=(8n) of their true values is su cient. Since 0 e n n, and 0 p n < 1, there are at most O(n 
Conclusions
A general problem is to characterize the conditions under which cryptographic applications are possible. By conditions we mean complexity theoretic conditions, e.g., P 6 = NP, the existence of one-way functions, etc. Examples of cryptographic applications are private key cryptography, identi cation/authentication, digital signatures, bit commitment, exchanging secrets, coin ipping over the telephone, etc.
For a variety of cryptographic applications it is known that a secure protocol can be constructed from a pseudorandom generator, e.g., the work of GGM : 86], LR : 88], GMR : 89], Naor : 88], GMW : 91], show that applications ranging from private key encryption to zero-knowledge proofs can be based on a pseudorandom generator. The results presented in this paper show that these same protocols can be based on any one-way function. The paper NY : 89] gives a signature scheme that can be based on any one-way permutation, and Rom : 90], substantially improves this by basing such a s c heme on any one-way function.
Using the notion of a false entropy generator, G : 89] shows that the existence of pseudorandom generators is equivalent to the existence of a pair of P-samplable distributions which are computationally indistinguishable but statistically very di erent. The paper IL : 89] provides complementary results a one-way function can be constructed from a secure protocol for any one of a variety of cryptographic applications, including private key encryption, identi cation/authentication, bit commitment and coin ipping by telephone. The paper OW : 93] shows that a one-way function can beconstructed from any non-trivial zero-knowledge proof protocol. Thus, secure protocols for any of these applications is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions.
The results described in this paper and the previous three paragraphs show that the existence of a one-way function is central to modern complexity based cryptography.
Some applications seem unlikely to be shown possible based on any one-way function, e.g., IR : 89] give strong evidence that exchanging secrets over a public channel is an application of this kind.
A fundamental issue is that of e ciency, both in size and time the general construction we give for a pseudorandom generator based on any one-way function increases the size of the input by a large polynomial amount and thus is only weak-preserving. This is not good news for practical applications it would be nice to have a general poly-preserving or a linear-preserving reduction.
